ABSTRACT
It is a peculiarity of both the research literature and the case law that, in respect of non-violent offending, mental disorder does not feature prominently even though non-violent offending constitutes over 80 per cent of crime (for a contrary example see Amos et al, 2010). There are a number of reasons for this. Not only does the process of pre-trial diversion help to fi lter away from the criminal courts a proportion of the less serious offences (see Lennox et al, 2009 on the variety of diversion schemes) but also, for those cases that do emerge through to trial, the limited nature of our mental condition defences means that psychiatric evidence has more relevance to disposal than it does to conviction. For example, diminished responsibility is only a defence to a charge of murder; the defence of insanity tends to be raised only in relation to the more serious cases of violence (although it is equally applicable to run-of-the-mill offences) where the potential stigma of a hospital-based disposal following such a fi nding of not guilty by reason of insanity can be outweighed by the absolution from culpability. Unfi tness to plead, discussed later in the book, is progressively diverting potentially culpable offenders away from trial into treatment;1 and guidance for Crown Prosecutors on the exercise of discretion in respect of the prosecution of those with frank mental disorders who become involved in more minor offending also serves to reduce the numbers of such people in the process. Finally, it is not uncommon for mental health problems only to be revealed on reception in prison, making their relevance to the trial process for those not held on remand problematic. All of this means that despite the inevitable presence of many people with mental disorder in the offending population (see Lord Bradley, 2009) mental disorder does not feature as it arguably should as a relevant factor in determining guilt in non-violent crime.
