ABSTRACT
The sudden and totally unexpected disintegration of the Soviet Union brought to an abrupt end a bipolar system that had spanned the world for the previous four decades. It was one characterized not only by a strategic conflict between the two superpowers and the balance of nuclear power, but also by a clash between two distinct ideological, political and economic systems. At a stroke the old world order disappeared to be replaced by uncertainty as to how best to understand the new era of international politics. With the removal of the worldwide divisions of the Cold War system and with the recognition that Soviet style socialist economics were not a viable alternative to the market-based international economy all the barriers to the worldwide spread of capitalism disappeared. This left the United States as the sole superpower to enjoy what was called its ‘unipolar moment’.1 The spread of globalization and the attendant rapid economic changes were to see the centre of gravity of the international political economy shift decisively from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The main beneficiary of globalization was China despite, or as its rulers claim, because of the continued rule of the Communist Party. China rose from being primarily a regional great power into becoming a global actor. Not only did it become the world’s leading manufacturer, but it also became a major economic player in the Middle East, Africa and South America. China’s rise, however, has also been accompanied by the rise of others, such as India and Brazil, and a resurgent Russia, while Japan remains an important player. Although the United States still remains the only truly global power, with an economy accounting for nearly 25 per cent of the world’s GNP (IMF 2009) and by far the most powerful military forces, outnumbering the next sixteen countries (SIPRI 2009), its relative power has been reduced by the ‘rise of the rest’.2 Therefore the structure of international politics after the first decade of the twenty-first century is best captured by the concept of multipolarity, despite continuing American pre-eminence. In the two decades that have passed since the end of the Cold War it has
become clear that the geopolitical boundaries of the Asia-Pacific region have changed, partly due to the effects of globalization and the intensification of
transnational issues and partly because of political developments attendant upon the repositioning of the great powers and the more important role played by middle and lesser powers. The break-up of the Soviet Union occasioned the emergence of independent states in Central Asia and, due to the strategic, political interests of China and Russia, the significance of Central Asia became a new factor in the region. Russia itself, as the successor in many respects to the Soviet Union, at first almost ceased to be a major player, but as it has since re-established a degree of domestic political order and coherence, it has once again sought to become a significant player. The rise of India has introduced this major power into the region as a player of growing economic and strategic influence, beyond its traditional confinement to South Asia. But Afghanistan and Pakistan are still excluded from the region notwithstanding the pervasiveness of the American-led war on terror, or India’s ongoing deep-rooted conflict with Pakistan centring on Kashmir and China’s ‘all weather friendship’ with that country. One indication of the difference between the claims of India and the other two to membership of the Asia-Pacific region is that India is a member of most of the region’s institutions, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are not. The United States remained as the sole superpower, but despite its apparent
dominance, the United States was unable to reshape the world in accordance with its vision of free markets and democratization. For example, the American attempt to persuade China to improve its practice of human rights by using trade as a lever failed miserably in 1994 after a year of trying.3 Similarly, the American-led attempts to address the problems of civil wars and the breakdown of order within states through humanitarian intervention, as displayed in the Balkans, did not prove successful in Somalia. Following the declaration of the war on terror after 9/11 in 2001, the US launched a war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and then another in Iraq, which had yet to show signs of imminent conclusion at the time of writing in July 2010. These two hugely costly wars have constrained the US strategically and contributed to the nation’s indebtedness. The United States has also failed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons first to India and Pakistan, then to North Korea and possibly Iran. When combined with the impact of the gravest financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s the perception grew in much of the world, including at home, that the United States was in relative decline. The turning point was ‘9/11’, less because of the impact of the terrorist act
itself (huge though that was) than because of the reaction of the Bush administration in launching two long wars and pursuing economic policies that culminated in the great financial crisis of 2008. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century the United States may still have remained the world’s sole superpower, but it’s so-called hegemony was being successfully challenged by the combined effect of the rise of the independent power of China and, to a lesser extent, India, Brazil and a resurgent Russia. Even though little could be done on a global scale without American leadership, America could no longer act unilaterally. It had to act multilaterally, or perhaps more accurately, in partnership
with others. These poles, or other centres of power or global significance, which also included the European Union and Japan, differed markedly in their characteristics and capabilities and were by no means in alignment together to balance American power. Rather they were separate constellations of power, some seen as rising – notably China, India and Brazil – while others were perceived by comparison as stagnating if not actually declining – Japan and the EU – and Russia was seeking to restore lost Soviet power. However, there was no question of these great powers combining to balance against American power, yet such was their respective weight in world affairs that collectively they ended up constraining the US from being able to act successfully on its own. These powers both cooperated and competed with each other and each still found its relationship with the United States to be more important than any other relationship. Yet the United States and its Western partners, who hitherto had dominated the international economy, found that they could not properly address the problems, which arose from the American-created financial crisis of 2008, in the previous manner through their Group of 7 or 8. The previously formed Group of 20 dramatically came into its own as this much larger gathering (which included the rising powers) met in Pittsburgh and London in 2009 to agree on measures to manage the crisis. The United States found that it could not necessarily get its own way. The same was true of the Copenhagen Meeting in December 2009 to deal with climate change.4
