ABSTRACT

We can recollect no instance, in modern times, of literary talent so entirely wasted, and great mental power so absolutely unproductive, as in the case of this eminent author. Whether it be for want of due regulation, of proper self-government, or of studied fixedness of purpose, it is certain, that few works are now produced, even from the pens of notoriously feeble writers, so deplorably unreadable as those of Mr. Coleridge. Will our readers feel much attracted towards the present volume, by the following extract? which we assure them is far from an unfavourable specimen.

And now for the answer to the question, What is an IDEA, if it mean neither an impression on the senses, nor a definite conception, nor an abstract notion? (And if it does mean either of these, the word is superfluous: and while it remains undetermined which of these is meant by the word, or whether it is not which you please, it is worse than superfluous. See the STATEMAN’S MANUAL, Appendix ad finem.) But supposing the word to have a meaning of its own, what does it mean? What is an IDEA? In answer to this I commence with the absolutely Real, as the PROTHESIS; the subjectively REAL, as the THESIS; the objectively REAL, as the ANTITHESIS: and I affirm, that Idea is the Indifference of the two—so namely, that if it be conceived as in the subject, the Idea is an Object, and possesses Objective Truth; but if in an Object, it is then a Subject, and is necessarily thought of as exercising the powers of a Subject. Thus an IDEA conceived as subsisting in an object becomes a LAW; and a law contemplated subjectively (in a mind) is an idea.