ABSTRACT
This chapter describes an approach to nation-building that was chaotic and disordered, which was driven by both inadequate leadership and bureaucratic factions with different interests, perceptions, cultures and power. It proceeds by first considering President George W. Bush's relatively disinterested attitude to nation-building in Afghanistan, which enlarged the scope for bureaucratic manoeuvring and power plays. The chapter outlines the roles that the military establishment, the State Department and United States Agency for International Development played in nation-building in Afghanistan. It examines the 'Counter-Bureaucracy', a blanket term for Washington's regulatory bodies. The chapter discusses a series of inter-agency problems, which ultimately rendered the US nation-building project in Afghanistan incoherent. It provides evidence for both a lack of strong leadership on nation-building in Afghanistan, and bureaucratic incoherence driven by different agency interests, perceptions, culture and power. The military establishment, meanwhile, had unrestricted access to the rest of the country.
