ABSTRACT
Decision-makers and their critics employ reasoning by historical analogy to interpret new events as well as deploying historical analogies to mobilise public opinion. During the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003, proponents and opponents of war trotted out the historical analogies of Munich and Vietnam. But for proponents of the war to argue that not taking decisive military action against Saddam Hussein was tantamount to appeasement was to completely distort the meaning of the Munich analogy. On the political side, the success or failure of the United States in Iraq may have analogues to the US experience in Vietnam - specifically, the American failure to construct a politically and militarily viable state in South Vietnam, and the collapse over time of domestic political support for the war. The lesson of Vietnam better informs America’s dilemmas and challenges in post-Ba’athist Iraq than the lesson of Munich did for the decision to invade in the first place.
