ABSTRACT
This chapter takes up the listed problems in the chapter and other fundamental problems for setting out a precise account of the nature of free action encapsulated in the intuitions driving the incompatibilist argument. It elaborates the central difficulties for presenting an incompatibilist free will theory, giving sense to critics' judgments that some sort of compatibilist analysis of free will must be right, since all incompatibilist accounts are doomed to failure through incoherency. The chapter addresses head-on the perplexing but crucial task of giving a positive incompatibilist theory of the nature of free agency. It sets out various sorts of incompatibilist accounts of freedom, some of: which have, in the author's judgment, more strength and plausibility than others. The chapter describes theories of free will sharing this assumption as 'indeterminist', 'incompatibilist', and 'libertarian', using the terms here interchangeably. Libertarians, then, share the problem of providing a positive thesis concerning the metaphysical conditions enabling free will.
