ABSTRACT
A central concept to pragmatics is that of the speech act, or more specifically, the illocutionary act – what the speaker actually does in uttering a sentence. The concept as found in contemporary linguistic theory was originally developed in philosophy by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969, 1979). The most widely accepted speech act classification is that of Searle, outlined briefly here (for a survey of prior classifications, see Hancher 1979: 1–4):
Representative: an assertion of a proposition, e.g. It’s cold here.
Directive: a request that the addressee do something, such as produce an utterance (Who just came in?) or perform an action (Please give that to me).
Commissive: a commitment by the speaker to perform an action, e.g. I promise to return by 5.
Declaration: a speech act which by virtue of being uttered causes a change in the world, e.g. I now declare you man and wife (uttered in the appropriate context).
Expressive: an expression of speaker attitude towards a state of affairs, as in I’m sorry to hear that.
