ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the position known as eliminativism, roughly, the view that virtue ethics should not provide an account of right action at all. It examines some of the accounts, it is useful to consider why so many virtue ethicists seem reluctant or even unwilling to talk about right action. Aristotelian virtue ethicists think about right action in terms of the actions and attitudes of the moral expert—the fully virtuous or "qualified" agent. Attitudes and emotions play a role in the assessment of an action is when an agent finds himself in a tragic dilemma a situation in which he is forced to make a choice between two or more terrible actions. A different moral dilemma occurs when an agent finds himself in a difficult situation because of some character defect or past wrongdoing. Michael Slote's main argument in support of an agent-based account of right action is that it allows us to avoid the problem of moral luck.
