ABSTRACT
German diplomats believed that Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) could lead to a violation of the Anti-Ballistic MissileTreaty, which Genscher had labeled the "Magna Charta" of detente. An initial German government statement in 1984 showed a markedly stronger West German interest in the potential arms control implications of SDI than in its potential strategic significance. Helmut Kohl expressed his understanding for Reagan's strategic objective, but reiterated the German government's desire to maintain a positive East-West environment. Despite the doubts raised in Germany and elsewhere about the implications of a strategic defense system, some Germans—like many Americans—saw SDI as a way to preserve the effectiveness of extended deterrence by reducing US vulnerability. The Soviet Union also began to realize that alliance attitudes could play an important role on SDI matters. Kohl showed his own interest in Europe by turning to France in reaction to both SDI and Reykjavik.
